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In this thesis there is detected a threat in 3G mobile phone, specifically in the 
eventual draining terminal’s battery due to undesired data traffic. 
The objectives of the thesis are to analyse the battery drain of 3G mobile 
phones because of uplink and downlink traffic and to model the battery drain. 
First of all, there is described how we can make a mobile phone to increase its 
consumption, and therefore to shorten its battery life time. Concretely, we focus 
in data traffic. This traffic can come from a legal application, or it can be caused 
by an attack designed to drain battery. 
Following, there is an introduction to theoretical concepts of 3G networks, 
Internet protocols, port scan and batteries. 
After that, there is defined an attack that can drain terminal batteries. Making 
use of this attack, there are realized several measures of battery duration in 
different conditions and different mobile phones. Measurement results are 
compared and analysed. 
Afterwards, there is modelled the expected battery life time of a mobile phone, 
having as input data the packets received and sent. There is also defined an 
“Energy Efficiency” variable that determines the amount of power that a 
running application in a mobile phone is consuming according to the data sent.    
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En aquesta tesis es detecta una amenaça en telèfons mòbils 3G, 
concretament en la possibilitat de reduir la càrrega de la bateria del terminal 
degut al tràfic de dades no desitjat. 
Els objectius de la tesis són analitzar la reducció de la càrrega de la bateria de 
telèfons mòbils 3G a causa del tràfic de pujada i baixada i el modelatge 
d’aquesta reducció de bateria. 
Primer de tot, es descriu com podem produir que un telèfon mòbil incrementi el 
seu consum energètic, i per consegüent redueixi el temps de treball de la 
bateria. Concretament, ens centrem en el tràfic de dades. Aquest tràfic poc 
provenir d’una aplicació legítima o pot ser causat per un atac dissenyat per 
reduir la càrrega de la bateria.  
 Seguidament, hi ha una introducció a conceptes teòrics de xarxes 3G, 
protocols d’Internet, escàners de ports i bateries.  
Després, hi ha definit un atac que pot reduir la càrrega de la bateria de 
terminals. Fent ús d’aquest atac, es realitzen diverses mesures de la duració 
de la bateria en diferents condicions i amb diferents telèfons mòbils. Els 
resultats de les mesures es comparat i analitzat. 
Més endavant, es modela el temps estimat de vida de la bateria del telèfon 
mòbil, tenint com a dades prèvies els paquets rebuts i enviats. També es 
definida una variable d’“Eficiència d’Energia” que determina la quantitat 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Motivation 
Nowadays, mobile phones tend to be connected to Internet during long time, for 
example iPhone or Android mobiles. The number of applications that need a 
network connection are more popular each time and Internet data planes are 
becoming affordable.  
When a mobile phone is connected to Internet, it is reachable through the 
network. For instance, in UMTS connections the mobile phone has its own IP 
address.  
When a mobile phone is connected to the network, if it is in an active mode, it 
consumes a high amount of power, so after some timeout it changes to a power 
safe state. There exist two different situations for the phone to change again to 
an active mode. Because of mobile initiated packets, it means that the mobile 
sends a packet to the network, it can be considered as normal operation. Or 
because of network initiated packets, when the terminal receives a packet from 
the network. 
This second case can be considered as a threat, because it is not initiated by 
the mobile phone. It can be caused by some push service, virus spreading, 
background radiation or P2P remaining due to new IP address. It has to be 
taken into account that an IP address is dynamically assigned to a mobile 
phone when it connects to the network, and that this IP address was associated 
to another user before. A malicious user can take advantage of this case to 
drain the battery due to downlink packets. 
In this thesis we identify and study a mobile phone’s battery drain attack. We 
demonstrate its impact, specifically we show how a well-timed low volume 
attack can drain a mobile phone’s battery 26 times faster than in normal 
operation.  
The low volume nature of this attack allows it to avoid detection by existing 
intrusion detection algorithms, which are often signature or volume based [1]. 
According to UMTS Forum [12], third generation (3G) subscriptions to UMTS 
networks based on WCDMA technology exceeded 300 million in 2008 and 
increasing. As the number of data-capable wireless end-points escalates, they 
will become susceptible targets of this attack. 
2 Analysing and Modelling Battery Drain of 3G Terminals due to Port Scan Attacks 
1.2. Objectives 
The main objectives of this thesis are to analyse power consumption in mobile 
phones, to detect a threat in 3G mobile phone, specifically in the eventual 
draining terminal’s battery due to undesired data traffic, and to model the 
battery drain. 
The phases followed to accomplish these objectives are: 
 To detect the vulnerabilities in a UMTS network. 
 To study and understand the effect of incoming packets in mobile phone 
power consumption. 
 To demonstration of how an attacker may exploit downlink traffic to drain 
a mobile phone’s battery. 
 To model mobile power consumption. 
 To identify when data traffic is energy inefficient. 
1.3. Document Structure 
This document is organized in seven chapters. The first chapter is this one, 
which introduces the topic and the objectives of the thesis. 
In Chapter 2 there are explained some previous concepts required to 
understand next chapters. These explanations are about UMTS network, TCP, 
Port Scans and mobile phone batteries. 
Next, in Chapter 3, there are introduced the vulnerabilities regarding to power 
consumption in mobile phones. It is also defined a possible attack to drain 
mobile phone’s batteries. 
Following, in Chapter 4 and 5, it is reproduced an attack to measure the effect 
in phone battery drain. First it is described the test scenario and its components, 
and after the measurements realized and it results. 
Chapter 6 models mobile phone energy consumption when it receives downlink 
data, from the practical data obtained in previous chapters. In addition, in this 
chapter there is defined a method to detect if some traffic is energy efficient or 
not.  
Finally, there are the conclusions of this thesis in Chapter 7. 
 




CHAPTER 2. THEORY BASICS 
This chapter will explain to the reader the basic knowledge about UMTS 
networks, port scan and kind of batteries to correctly follow the report. It will 
help to understand the attack approach as well as how some empirical 
measurements are done. The main aim is that any reader not familiarized with 
that technology can follow the report without problems. 
2.1. UMTS Network 
In this section, we present an overview of the network elements of 3G network 
architecture and their inter-connections, specifically UMTS (Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System) network architecture. In Fig. 2.1 there is the 
schema of a UMTS network. 
 
Fig. 2.1 UMTS Network 
2.1.1. UMTS Network Architecture 
The basic system architecture of UMTS splits the components into three parts, 
see Fig. 2.2. The UE (User Equipment) represents all parts handled by the 
users, including the mobile and the USIM (UMTS SIM). The UTRAN (UMTS 
Terrestrial Radio Access Network) contains all parts necessary for the radio 
connections. It includes the Node B (Base Station) and the RNC (Radio 
Network Controller). Finally the CN (Core Network) which is responsible for 
switching and routing calls and data connections to external networks.  
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Fig. 2.2 High level UMTS architecture 
2.1.1.1. UE 
The UE (User Equipment) consist of two parts: the ME (Mobile Equipment) and 
the USIM (UMTS Subscriber Identity Module). The ME provides all the hard and 
software that is needed to access the standard UMTS services. The USIM 
holds the user specific information.  
2.1.1.2. UTRAN 
The UTRAN (UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network) consists of RNCs 
(Radio Network Controllers) and Node Bs. The Node B main tasks are channel 
coding, interleaving, rate adoption, adding scrambling codes and modulation. In 
HSDPA (High Speed Downlink Packet Access) the Node B has to fulfil part of 
the scheduling and power control on its own.  
A RNC is the point where wireless link layer protocols terminate. It provides the 
interface between a mobile communicating through a Node B and the core 
network edge. This includes management of radio transceivers in Node Bs 
equipment (radio resource control), admission control, channel allocation, as 
well as management tasks such as handoffs between Node Bs and deciding 
power control parameters.  
2.1.1.3. Core Network 
CN (Core Network) incorporates transport and intelligence functions. The first 
functions support the transport of signalling and traffic information, including 
commutation. The routing lies in the intelligence functions, including features 
such as logic and control of certain services offered through a series of well-
defined interfaces; also include mobility management. Some components of the 
core network are SGSN (Serving GPRS Support Node), GGSN (Gateway 
GPRS Support Node), MSC (Mobile-Services Switching Centre), GMSC 
(Gateway MSC) and HLR (Home Location Register). 




The SGSN is responsible for sending data to and from mobile stations, in 
addition to maintaining information about the location of a mobile and 
performing authentication for the mobile.  
On the other hand, the GGSN is a GPRS network entity that serves as the 
mobile wireless gateway between an SGSN and the Internet. When a mobile 
successfully authenticates and registers with the network, a PPP (Point-to-
Point) link is set up between the GGSN and the mobile.  
Typically, there are multiple SGSNs, each of which serves the users physically 
located in its serving area [4]. 
It can be seen in Fig. 2.3 the hierarchical architecture, multiple mobiles 
communicate with a Node B, and multiple Node Bs communicate with an RNC, 
and multiple RNCs talk to the SGSN and GGSN to finally provide access to 
external networks. 
  
Fig. 2.3 UMTS network elements and interfaces (source: [5]) 
2.1.2. Channels 
There are three separate channel concepts in the UTRAN: logical, transport, 
and physical channels (Fig. 2.4). Logical channels define what type of data is 
transferred. These channels define the data-transfer services offered by the 
MAC (Medium Access Control) layer. That is, the concept of logical channels is 
used in the interface above the MAC. Transport channels define how and with 
which type of characteristics the data is transferred by the physical layer. These 
channels are used in the interface between the MAC and the PHY (Physical) 
layers. Physical channels define the exact physical characteristics of the radio 
channels. These are the channels used below the PHY layer. That is, in the 
radio interface. 
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Fig. 2.4 Channel concepts (source: [6]) 
2.1.2.1. Logical channels 
There are four different control channels in UMTS: The BCCH (Broadcast 
Control Channel) is a down link channel to spread the cell information. The 
PCCH (Paging Control Channel) is a down link channel to accomplish paging of 
mobiles in a cell. The DCCH (Dedicated Control Channel) is a bidirectional 
channel to establish point to point connections between a UE and the UTRAN. 
It is used for RRC (Radio Resource Control) procedures. The CCCH (Common 
Control Channel) is also a bidirectional transport channel, which is used to 
exchange control information between the UE and the UTRAN. UMTS supports 
two types of data channels: the DTCH (Dedicated Traffic Channel) is a 
bidirectional point to point channel assigned to a unique UE for user 
transmission and the CTCH (Common Traffic Channel) is similar to the DTCH 
for multicast transmissions. 
2.1.2.2. Transport channels 
The transport channels define how and with which type of characteristics the 
data is transferred by the physical layer. Transport channels are divided into 
common channels and dedicated channels. They are all unidirectional. A 
dedicated channel is assigned to one specific user, while the common channels 
can be used by all users in one cell. 
The only dedicated channel is the DCH (Dedicated Channel). It is used to 
transport the carry user data and signalling for higher network layers. 
UMTS define six types of common channels. The BCH (Broadcast Channel) is 
used to transmit cell information broadcasted by the RNC (e.g. free scrambling 
codes, code for the random access channel, and so on). The channel mapping 
shows that this channel is used by the BCCH. The BCH is downlink only. 




The FACH (Forward Access Channel) carries the user control information. The 
FACH is needed by the mobile stations to establish a radio link. Therefore, it 
uses a physical channel with the largest scrambling code (low data rate, good 
SNR) and is supported by power control. The FACH channel only supports 
downlink communications. The PCH (Paging Channel) is used to accomplish 
the paging procedures (call setup initiated by the RNC). The channel only 
supports downlink communications. 
The RACH (Random Access Channel) is an uplink channel that, together with 
the FACH, can be used to setup a radio link. Some operators also use a 
RACH/FACH combination to transmit small amount of data. 
The common packet channel is an extended version of the RACH enabling PS 
(Packet Switched) services that need to transmit several consecutive frames. It 
is again used together with the FACH. The channel supports only uplink 
communications. 
The DSCH (Downlink Shared Channel) can be used to transmit user and 
control data that should be readable by several mobile stations. The channel is 
downlink only. The functions are similar to the FACH, but the channel also 
supports a power control. The channel has to be paired with DCH [6]. 
2.1.3. PDP Context 
 A PDP (Packet Data Protocol) context offers a packet data connection over 
which the UE and the network can exchange IP packets. PDP context activation 
is initiated by the UE and changes the session management state to active, 
creates the PDP context, receives the IP address and reserves radio resources. 
After a PDP context activation the UE is able to send IP packets over the air 
interface. The UE can have up to 11 PDP contexts active concurrently. PDP 
contains the subscriber's session information when the subscriber has an active 
session [7]. 
2.1.4. Radio Resource Control 
In a UMTS network, a RRC (Radio Resource Control) part of the protocol stack 
is responsible for the assignment, configuration and release of radio resources 
between the UE and the UTRAN. This RRC protocol is described in detail in the 
3GPP TS 25.331 [16] specifications. Two basic modes that the UE can be in 
are defined as idle mode and UTRA connected mode. UTRA stands for UMTS 
Terrestrial Radio Access. In idle mode, the UE is required to request a RRC 
connection whenever it wants to send any user data or in response to a page 
whenever the UTRAN or the SGSN pages it to receive data from an external 
data network such as a push server. Idle and Connected mode behaviours are 
described in details in 3GPP specifications TS 25.304 and TS 25.331 [16][17].  
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Fig. 2.5 State transitions between the UTRA RRC  
In Fig. 2.5 there are the different UTRA RCC states and its transitions. When in 
a UTRA RRC connected mode, the device can be in one of four states. These 
are: 
 CELL-DCH: A dedicated channel is allocated to the UE in uplink and 
downlink in this state to exchange data. The UE must perform actions as 
outlined in 3GPP 25.331.  
 CELL_FACH: no dedicated channel is allocated to the user equipment in 
this state. Instead, common channels are used to exchange a small 
amount of bursty data. The UE must perform actions as outlined in 3GPP 
25.331 which includes the cell selection process as defined in 3GPP TS 
25.304.  
 CELL_PCH: the UE uses DRX (Discontinuous Reception) to monitor 
broadcast messages and pages via a PICH (Paging Indicator Channel). 
No uplink activity is possible. The UE must perform actions as outlined in 
3GPP 25.331 which includes the cell selection process as defined in 
3GPP TS 25.304. The UE must perform the CELL UPDATE procedure 
after cell reselection.  




 URA_PCH: the UE uses DRX to monitor broadcast messages and pages 
via a PICH. No uplink activity is possible. The UE must perform actions 
as outlined in 3GPP 25.331 including the cell selection process as 
defined in 3GPP TS 25.304. This state is similar to CELL_PCH, except 
that URA UPDATE procedure is only triggered via URA (UTRAN 
Registration Area) reselection.  
The transition from an idle to the connected mode and vise-versa is controlled 
by the UTRAN. When an idle mode UE requests an RRC connection, the 
network decides whether to move the UE to the CELL_DCH or CELL_FACH 
state. When the UE is in an RRC connected mode, again it is the network that 
decides when to release the RRC connection. The network may also move the 
UE from one RRC state to another prior to releasing the connection or in some 
cases instead of releasing the connection. The state transitions are typically 
triggered by data activity or inactivity between the UE and network. Since the 
network may not know when the UE has completed data exchange for a given 
application, it typically keeps the RRC connection for some time in anticipation 
of more data to/from the UE. This is typically done to reduce the latency of call 
set-up and subsequent radio bearer setup. The RRC connection release 
message can only be sent by the UTRAN. This message releases the signal 
link connection and all radio bearers between the UE and the UTRAN. 
2.2. TCP 
The characteristics of the incoming data depend on the properties of the 
transport protocol [4]. Non-real time traffic is typically carried using TCP 
(Transmission Control Protocol). 
TCP is a communication protocol, connection oriented and reliable in the 
transport layer currently documented in IETF RFC 793 [18]. It is a Layer 4 
protocol as the OSI model. 
TCP is developed as a highly reliable, end-to-end, window-based protocol 
between hosts in computer networks. According to congestion control, modern 
implementations of TCP contain four intertwined algorithms: slow start, 
congestion avoidance, fast retransmit, and fast recovery [19]. When a new TCP 
connection is established, TCP enters slow start where congestion window 
(cwnd) evolves exponentially. On each acknowledgement for new data, cwnd is 
increased by one segment. At some point the capacity of the network is 
reached and packet losses are experienced at congested routers. There are 
two indications of packet loss: (a) the expiration of the timeout timer, and (b) the 
receipt of duplicate ACKs. If three or more duplicate ACKs are received, it is 
considered an indication that a segment has been lost. TCP then performs a 
retransmission without waiting for a retransmission timer to expire. 
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2.2.1. TCP Ports 
TCP uses the notion of port numbers to identify sending and receiving 
application end-points on a host, or Internet sockets. Each side of a TCP 
connection has an associated 16-bit unsigned port number (0-65535) reserved 
by the sending or receiving application. Arriving TCP data packets are identified 
as belonging to a specific TCP connection by its sockets, that is, the 
combination of source host address, source port, destination host address, and 
destination port. This means that a server computer can provide several clients 
with several services simultaneously, as long as a client takes care of initiating 
any simultaneous connections to one destination port from different source 
ports. 
2.2.2. Connection Establishment 
To establish a connection, TCP uses a three-way handshake. Before a client 
attempts to connect with a server, the server must first bind to a port to open it 
up for connections: this is called a passive open. Once the passive open is 
established, a client may initiate an active open. To establish a connection, the 
three-way (or 3-step) handshake occurs: 
 The active open is performed by the client sending a SYN to the server. 
It sets the segment's sequence number to a random value, say A. 
 In response, the server replies with a SYN-ACK. The acknowledgment 
number is set to one more than the received sequence number [A], and 
the sequence number that the server chooses for the packet is another 
random number, say B. 
 Finally, the client sends an ACK back to the server. The sequence 
number is set to the received acknowledgement value, and the 
acknowledgement number is set to one more than the received 
sequence number i.e. B. 
At this point, both the client and server have received an acknowledgment of 
the connection. 
2.2.3. Connection Termination 
The connection termination phase uses, at most, a four-way handshake, with 
each side of the connection terminating independently. When an endpoint 
wishes to stop its half of the connection, it transmits a FIN packet, which the 
other end acknowledges with an ACK. Therefore, a typical tear-down requires a 
pair of FIN and ACK segments from each TCP endpoint. 




2.3. Port Scan 
A port scanner is a software application designed to probe a network host for 
open ports. Used to detect which services are offered by the host and potential 
security vulnerabilities based on open ports. It is used by system administrators 
to analyse possible security problems, but is also used by hackers that attempt 
to compromise machine or network security. 
The result of a scan on a port is usually generalized into one of three 
categories: 
 Open or Accepted: The host sent a reply indicating that a service is 
listening on the port. 
 Closed or Denied or Not Listening: The host sent a reply indicating that 
connections will be denied to the port. 
 Filtered, Dropped or Blocked: There was no reply from the host. 
2.3.1. Nmap 
Nmap is a security scanner originally written by Gordon Lyon. Nmap is a 
"Network Mapper", used to discover computers and services on a computer 
network, thus creating a "map" of the network. Just like many simple port 
scanners, Nmap is capable of discovering passive services on a network 
despite the fact that such services are not advertising themselves with a service 
discovery protocol. In addition Nmap may be able to determine various details 
about the remote computers. These include operating system, device type, 
uptime, software product used to run a service, exact version number of that 
product, presence of some firewall techniques and, on a local area network, 
even vendor of the remote network card. 
Nmap runs on Linux, Microsoft Windows, Solaris, and BSD (including Mac OS 
X), and also on AmigaOS. 
2.3.2. Ping  
Ping is a computer network tool used to test whether a particular host is 
reachable across an IP network; it is also used to self-test the network interface 
card of the computer, or as a latency test. It works by sending ICMP “echo 
request” packets to the target host and listening for ICMP “echo response” 
replies. The "echo response" is sometimes called a pong. Ping measures the 
round-trip time and records any packet loss, and prints when finished a 
statistical summary of the echo response packets received, the minimum, 
mean, maximum and in some versions the standard deviation of the round trip 
time. 
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Ping works on several operating systems as Linux, Windows or MAC OS X. 
2.3.3. Hping 
Hping is a free packet generator and analyser for the TCP/IP protocol 
distributed. Hping can be used to create IP packets containing TCP, UDP or 
ICMP payloads. All header fields can be modified and controlled using the 
command line. The interface is inspired to the ping command, but hping is not 
only able to send ICMP echo requests. It supports TCP, UDP, ICMP and RAW-
IP protocols, has a traceroute mode, the ability to send files between a covered 
channel, and many other features. 
Hping works on the following unix-like systems: Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD, 
OpenBSD, Solaris, Mac OS X, Windows. 
2.4. Batteries   
Batteries are an important component in mobile phones. The autonomy of 
mobile phone is directly dependant of them. There are three basic types of 
rechargeable battery used in mobile phones: Lithium Ion (Li-Ion), Nickel 
Cadmium (NiCd) and Nickel Metal Hydride (NiMH). 
2.4.1. Lithium-ion batteries 
Lithium-ion batteries are so common today in cell phones because they are one 
of the most energetic rechargeable batteries available. These kinds of batteries 
appeared when researchers attempted to develop rechargeable lithium 
batteries. In the beginning failed due to safety problems. Because of the 
inherent instability of lithium metal, especially during charging, research shifted 
to a non-metallic lithium battery using lithium ions. Although slightly lower in 
energy density than lithium metal, lithium-ion is safe, provided certain 
precautions are met when charging and discharging. In 1991, the Sony 
Corporation commercialized the first lithium-ion battery. Other manufacturers 
followed suit. 
Lithium-ion is a low maintenance battery, an advantage that most other 
chemistries (active chemicals used in the cell) cannot claim. There is no 
memory and no scheduled cycling is required to prolong the battery's life. In 
addition, they also have a self-discharge rate of approximately 5-10% per 
month, compared with over 30% per month in common nickel metal hydride 
batteries, approx. 1.25% per month for Low Self-Discharge NiMH batteries and 
10% per month in nickel-cadmium batteries. 




Furthermore, lithium-ion cells cause little harm when disposed. 
2.4.1.1. Lithium-ion discharge curve 
Lithium-ion batteries have a fairly flat discharge curve while others such as 
Lead acid have a pronounced slope. A flat discharge curve simplifies the design 
of the application in which the battery is used since the supply voltage stays 
reasonably constant throughout the discharge cycle. A sloping curve facilitates 
the estimation of the State of Charge of the battery since the cell voltage can be 
used as a measure of the remaining charge in the cell. Modern Lithium Ion cells 
have a very flat discharge curve and other methods must be used to determine 
the State of Charge [20]. 
 
Fig. 2.6 Lithium-ion discharge curve (source: [20]) 
In Fig. 2.6 the X axis shows the cell characteristics normalized as a percentage 
of cell capacity so that the shape of the graph can be shown independent of the 
actual cell capacity. If the X axis was based on discharge time, the length of 
each discharge curve would be proportional to the nominal capacity of the cell. 
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2.4.1.2. Temperature Characteristics 
Cell performance can change dramatically with temperature. At the lower 
extreme the electrolyte may freeze setting a lower limit on the operating 
temperature, while at the upper extreme the active chemicals may break down 
destroying the battery. In between these limits the cell performance generally 
improves with temperature.  
 
Fig. 2.7 Temperature characteristics (source: [20]) 
Fig. 2.7 shows how the performance of Lithium-ion batteries deteriorates as the 
operating temperature decreases. 




CHAPTER 3. VULNERABILITIES AND ATTACK BASICS 
In this chapter it is explained the power consumption behaviour of a mobile 
phone when it receives or sends data traffic.  
It is also explained that a UMTS network can have vulnerabilities regarding to 
mobile phone power consumption and signalling messages. It is described how 
a malicious user can take advantage of the operation system of a UMTS 
network to drain mobile phone’s battery.   
3.1. Mobile Power Consumption 
As it is explained in Chapter 2, before the User Equipment can send or receive 
any packet it needs an active PDP context and to establish a connection with 
the UTRAN. The UE can have various radio resources assigned depending on 
its activity, it can be in a UTRA RCC Connected Mode or in an Idle Mode. The 
network is who decides to move the UE from one RCC state to another, or 
when to release the RCC connection. The network bases the decision of state 
transitions in data activity or inactivity between the UE and network. As it does 
not know if the UE is planning to send more data, typically it waits some timeout 
before making a transition.   
We have to bear in mind that the mobile phone consumes different power 
depending if it is in connected mode or in idle. Given that the parameters of 
state transitions are fixed by the network, we did a measurement to detect and 
evaluate them. 
We have a mobile that was in standby and that receives low data rate traffic. 
These low data rate is a packet of 58 bytes each 40 seconds. It is repeated 5 
times.  
We can observe in Fig. 3.1 that the graphic from the top is the power consumed 
by the mobile phone according to time, and the graphic from the bottom is the 
data received by the mobile phone in the downlink channel according to time. 
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Fig. 3.1 Mobile phone power and downlink rate according to time 
We can differentiate some different states in the power profile of Fig. 3.1. When 
there is no packet received, the mobile is consuming low power. We identify this 
state as level 4, the one where the mobile consumes less power. After, when 
the mobile receives one packet (Fig. 3.1, about second 190), the mobile phone 
changes to the highest power level consumption, we call this level 1. When the 
data is totally transferred, it changes to another state, level 2, where it reduces 
the power consumed. After a timeout –about 5 seconds- without receiving data, 
it changes to a lower power state, level 3. If there is no data received it stays 30 
seconds in this state, and after changes again to the lowest power consumption 
state, level 4. 
As it can be observed in the measurement, with just sending one low data size 
packet, it can be changed the power consumption behaviour of the mobile 
phone during more than 35 seconds. 
Different power levels can be caused by different access speeds and the use of 
different channels. The mapping of power level with access speed is in Table 
3.1. 
Level Access Speed/Channel 
Level 1 HSDPA 
Level 2 UMTS DCH 
Level 3 RACH 
Level 4 “Camping” State 
Table 3.1 Power levels and access speed 




3.2. UMTS Network Vulnerabilities 
UMTS networks are vulnerable in terms of power consumption of UE. When a 
mobile phone sends and receives data, the phone’s battery is drained at a 
much higher speed than in standby. 
We have seen that if a mobile phone receives just one low data packet its 
power consumption is modified for more than 30 seconds. Any application that 
sends data to the mobile makes it to consume more power than in normal 
operation. This application can be legitimate or unlawful. It can be that a mobile 
phone’s battery is being drain because it is receiving traffic of background 
radiation such as P2P remaining or viruses spreading. Or simply a push-service 
with bad design that sends packets in a bad timing (regarding with mobile 
power consumption). 
Besides, you have to keep in mind that UMTS networks have high signalling 
overhead, with existing standards. To transfer a similar amount of data, a lot 
more signalling messages/handshakes is needed for a wireless network than 
that in a wireline network. For instance, in order to improve the utilization of 
limited radio resources, a radio channel is only allocated to a mobile when there 
is data to transfer, and it will be revoked after an inactivity timeout. Such 
dynamic channel allocation and revocation procedures introduce lots of 
signalling operations. Each channel establishment/release requires the RNC 
and Node B to process more than 20 signalling messages. 
Because of the establishment and maintaining of a channel the mobile 
consumes a lot more power. 
Furthermore, if an attack is carried to large scale it can overload the control 
plane and detrimentally affect the key elements in a UMTS wireless 
infrastructure [10]. 
3.2.1. Battery Drain Attack 
In this thesis, we introduce a mobile phone’s battery drain attack, which seeks 
to drain mobile phone’s battery using low rate traffic, based on maintaining the 
mobile phone in a high energy consumption state. To accomplish this, an 
attacker has to send a low volume packet burst to a mobile with a certain 
timeout between packets.  
If the mobile does not currently have a radio channel, the network will allocate a 
new one to complete the data transfer. 
After an inactivity timeout, the radio channel is torn down to recycle it back for 
others’ use and help preserve the mobile energy that will otherwise be wasted 
on maintaining the channel. Immediately after the channel release, the attacker 
sends another low-volume packet burst to the mobile so as to trigger another 
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radio channel establishment. By repeatedly doing so at appropriately timed 
periods, this can generate a considerable number of mobile power state 
changes. It means that in normal operation the mobile would be in a low power 
state, while when it is being attacked it will be the major part of the time in a 
high power consumption level, so the consequence will be shortening the 
mobile phone’s battery life.  
These packet burst can easily be generated with some of the existing port 
scanning programs. 
To understand the damage caused by the signalling attack, suppose that a 
UMTS wireless network has inactivity timeout set to 5 seconds and that an 
attacker generates a 40-byte packet burst. By sending packet bursts 
periodically at a time slightly larger than 5 seconds, the attacker generates only 
64 bps attack traffic, which is invisible to volume based detection systems. 
As seen, the mobile phone’s battery drain attack can be achieved with low rate, 
low volume traffic. Thus, this attack can effectively evade detection by today’s 
intrusion detection/prevention systems, which are effective mostly against 
ﬂooding-based DoS attacks.  
 




CHAPTER 4. MEASUREMENTS SETUP 
We want to reproduce the phone’s battery drain attack. In this chapter there is 
explained the needed equipment required to perform this attack. 
The battery drain attack consists in an attacker sending packets through 
Internet to a mobile phone, so it forces the mobile phone to establish a 
connection with the network, and consequently increase its power 
consumptions. As the power consumption is increased, the working time of the 
mobile phone’s battery is shortened. 
Consequently, we can define two actors in this attack, the traffic source (or 
attacker), who is the one who sends packets, and the traffic sink (or the target), 
that is the mobile whose battery is being drained. 
4.1. Traffic Source (Attacker) 
The main action of the attacker is to send packets to a mobile phone. In this 
thesis we are centred in the battery draining. To make the study easier we are 
going to suppose that the IP address of the target is known. There are some 
other investigations which deal with the obtaining of the IP [11]. 
Apart of the basic feature of sending packets, to test the attack in different 
conditions it is needed to change the packet size, and the data rate or timeout 
between packets. 
First of all, we needed to check that the mobile is accessible through Internet 
and that packets sent are actually received by the mobile phone, and not filtered 
(for example by a firewall) in the UMTS network. We did a port scan with nmap 
[14] and hping [13] to all the TCP ports of a UMTS mobile phone. We obtained 
that almost all the ports are open, in Appendix A there is the complete list with 
the state of the ports.  After that, we checked if it is possible to wake up the 
mobile with pings, if they are filtered or they are not. We found that they are 
allowed, and the mobile phone also answers to them.  
So we have checked three different programs that allow sending traffic to the 
mobile and waking it up to a high power consumption state.  
4.2. Traffic Sink (Target) 
The traffic sink consists of a UMTS mobile phone that receives the packets sent 
by the traffic source. It is necessary that the mobile is connected and reachable 
through Internet. It can be reachable because it is browsing the web with the 
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phone browser or because the mobile phone is connected to a computer acting 
like a modem. 
If the mobile is connected to the computer we can capture the received and 
sent packets, and also make use of a firewall to filter undesired packets, or 
uplink channel. 
The main interest in the target is to monitor battery drain. It can be controlled in 
different ways. An option is to time how long does the mobile phone battery 
lasts since it is fully charged until it is discharged, measuring it in different 
situations. But this option is not the optimal, it takes a lot of time and it is not 
possible to know the progress of the power consumption. 
A better option is to install in the mobile phone an application able to measure 
and record the current power and the estimated battery operation time. There is 
an application developed by Nokia called Energy Profiler that includes this 
features. It is deeply explained in 4.2.1 Energy Profiler. 
Finally, it is necessary to use some mobiles to reproduce the battery drain 
attack. They need to be UMTS mobile phones. In 4.2.2 Mobile Phones it is 
explained the selected terminals. 
4.2.1. Energy Profiler 
Nokia Energy Profiler is a stand-alone test and measurement application for 
Symbian S60 3rd Edition, Feature Pack 1 and later devices. The application 
enables to test and monitor applications’ energy usage in real time on target 
devices [21].  
While an application is in use, Nokia Energy Profiler can be run in the 
background to profile power consumption. 
It is possible to study the measured results on the mobile phone screen or to 
export them in various formats for later analysis. It is possible exporting as CSV, 
which preserves all the measurement data and enables to process it in 
Microsoft Excel or other ways. 
Energy Profiler can measure and record: 
 Power consumption, as well as battery voltage and current. 
 Cumulative energy consumption. 
 Processor activity. 
 RAM use. 
 IP-network speeds. 
 Mobile-network signal strengths. 




 3G Timers. 
 WLAN signal strength. 
It is possible to use Nokia Energy Profiler to determine the baseline power 
consumption for a test device in standby mode and, after starting the attack. 
Simply compare the resulting profiles to check for the increase in power 
consumption. 
The main measure that we are going to use is power. Power view shows power 
consumption over a measurement period. The basic unit is watt (W). It is 
possible to switch between average and instant power. When the power view is 
active (Fig. 4.1), it also indicates the estimated battery time, in hours and 
minutes, that a full battery would last with the measured average power 
consumption. 
Battery time is the estimated time that will elapse since the battery is fully 
charge until it is fully discharged. This estimation is based on the average power 
measured over the entire region of the measure. 
 
Fig. 4.1 A trace session in Nokia Energy Profiler (source: [21]) 
4.2.1.1. Restrictions  
It has to be taken into account that Energy Profiler itself consumes power, so it 
is advised to use as few measures as possible. Measurement speed can be set 
to 0.25, 1 or 5 seconds. It is recommended to use a 1 or 5 second 
measurement period to get more accurate results in Standby.  
Nokia Energy Profiler has an emergency-save feature. This enables to record a 
trace until the battery is fully discharged. Then simply recover the 
measurements the next time the tool is launched. Making use of this feature, it 
is possible to fully charge the battery and then continuously drain the battery 
until it is fully discharged.  
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Taking advantage of this feature, we measured the difference between the 
battery lifetime indicated by Energy Profiler with the time that actually lasts to 
fully drain the battery. The measurements have been done in different 
conditions: just in Standby and with the mobile phone receiving packets. The 
results show that the Energy Profiler estimated battery time is 7% higher that 
the empirical time. It could be because when we take measures with Energy 
Profiler we have the screen and backlight off, while in the empirical case, when 
the mobile is running out of battery it turns on the display to advise that there is 
“low battery”, repeatedly each some minutes. Turning the screen on makes 
increase the power consumption, so the battery life is shortened. 
4.2.2. Mobile Phones 
In order to use Nokia Energy Profiler, as it is designed to work in a Nokia 
phone, we selected to use a mobile phone of this company. It had to be 
operating system Symbian S60 3rd Edition or later. Furthermore, we decided to 
use two different UMTS mobile phones to compare the results and have more 
results to compare. The selected mobile phones are Nokia 6120 Classic (Fig. 
4.2) and Nokia 5800 XpressMusic (Fig. 4.3), their main features are below. 
4.2.2.1.  Nokia 6120 Classic 
Operating Frequency:  
 EGSM 850/900/1800/1900 







Software Platform & User Interface: 
 S60 3rd Edition, Feature Pack 1 
 Symbian OS v9.2 
Hardware: 
 CPU ARM11 369 MHz 
 NAND Memory   128 MB    
 
 
Fig. 4.2 Nokia 6120 
 




 SDRAM Memory  64 MB 
Battery: 
  BL-5B 3.7V 890mAh Li-Ion 
4.2.2.2. Nokia 5800 XpressMusic 
Operating frequency: 
 WCDMA 900/2100 
 GSM/EDGE 850/900/1800/1900 
Data Bearing: 
 CSD 





 WLAN IEEE 802.11 b/g 
Software Platform & User Interface: 
 S60 5th Edition 
 Symbian OS version 9.4 
Hardware: 
 CPU ARM11 434 MHz 
 NAND Memory 256 MB    
 SDRAM Memory 128 MB 
Battery: 
 BL-5J 1320 mAh Li-Ion 
 
Fig. 4.3 Nokia 5800 
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CHAPTER 5. MEASUREMENTS 
In this chapter there are shown the conditions used in the following 
measurements, the measurements itself and the results obtained from them. 
There are done replicas of the phone’s battery drain attack. From these tests 
we expect to obtain practical knowledge about the power consumption 
behaviour when the mobile phone is attacked. Moreover, we want to check if 
the battery drain attack is effective, and in which case this attack is more 
harmful. 
In the following tests we vary some parameters. In the traffic source we vary the 
timeout between packets sent and its size. In the traffic sink we modify the 
mobile equipment, allowing the user terminal to reply or not to the incoming 
packets (uplink channel) and to act like a modem connected to a computer or to 
be on its own. 
5.1. Measurement Conditions 
The typical test scenario in all measurements is shown in Fig. 5.1. On the right 
hand side there is the traffic source (attacker), which just needs a computer to 
send packets to the target. 
On the left hand side there is the traffic sink (victim). It is composed by a mobile 
phone, which is running Energy Profiler to monitor its power consumption. In 
some measures there is a computer connected to mobile phone. 
 
Fig. 5.1 Measurement Scenario 
Next, there is the test scenario description that includes the characteristics of 
the elements and the programs that are running and why they are useful.  




Traffic source (attacker), a computer with the following characteristics: 
 Intel computer 
 SO: Ubuntu 
 Internet wired connection, TU Wien Internet access 
 Programs running: 
o Wireshark: to verify that the packets are correctly sent 
o Ping, nmap and hping: to send packets 
Traffic sink (victim), mobile phones Nokia 5800 and Nokia 6120 (described in 
section 4.2.2) with SIM card PRO of A1 (Mobilkom) and in some measurements 
a computer with the following characteristics: 
 Intel computer 
 SO: Windows XP and Windows Vista 
 Internet connection via mobile phone Nokia 5800 or Nokia 6120 
 Programs running: 
o Wireshark: to verify that the packets are correctly sent 
o GhostWall FireWall: to filter unwanted traffic  
o Nokia PC Suite: to realize connection with the mobile 
 
Finally, add that the situation of all the measurements is in a Laboratory of TU 
(Technical University) in Vienna (Austria). They are done in a real network. 
5.2. Nokia 5800 Measurements 
The following measures are done with the mobile phone Nokia 5800. In Fig. 5.2 
there is shown the behaviour of phone’s battery estimated operation time 
according to packets received at different timeout between packets. The mobile 
has active the uplink and downlink channel, so it also answers to the received 
packets. In this measure the mobile is on its own, not connected to a computer. 
In Y axis there is the estimated operation time of the battery in minutes. It 
means how many minutes the battery can last since it is fully charged until it is 
completely discharged. To completely understand the values of the following 
graphics, it has to be taken into account that the Standby operation time of 
Nokia 5800 is 260 hours (15600 minutes). This value has been obtained in 
empirical measurement. 
In X axis there is the timeout between packets, the seconds that are between 
one packet ant the next one. It can be understand as the data rate of the 
packets.  
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Fig. 5.2 Estimated operation time Nokia 5800 
To obtain the measures of each point there have been made test that consisted 
of a mobile phone receiving packets each certain seconds (timeout) during 30 
minutes. After the test, we get the average power consumption during this 
measurement and then through Energy Profiler we obtain the time that would 
last the battery with this consumption. 
It can be observed that the lowest operation time is when there is the lowest 
timeout between packets, that is the same that saying that when there is the 
higher data rate of received packets. When timeout between packets is 0.1 
second, battery operation time is 250 minutes. Otherwise, the highest battery 
operation time is reached when the packets are the most separated between 
them. When the timeout between packets is 60 seconds, the estimated 
operation time of the battery is higher than 1400 minutes. 
It can be noticed that the shape of Fig. 5.2 has a tendency of increase almost 
linearly. The more emphasized raises take place in the extremes, when the 
timeout between packets is really small or really large. To give some numerical 
values, when the timeout between packets is 5 seconds, the estimated battery 
operation time is 600 minutes, and when the timeout between packets is 45 
seconds, the estimated battery time is 800 minutes. 
Also, it is remarkable the point when time between packets is 40 seconds 
because is the unique where increasing the timeout between packets the 
estimated battery time decreases. To explain the reason it is necessary to have 
a look at the behaviour of power consumption (Fig. 5.3, Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5). 
These graphics show mobile phone power consumption (Y axis) over time (X 
axis) in different timeout between packets. 




We are going to begin when the mobile is receiving packets at high data rate. In 
Fig. 5.3 there is a zoom in the power consumption when timeout between 
packets is 0.1 seconds. Mobile phone is always consuming the same amount of 
power, slightly more than 1 W. We can consider that it is always in high level of 
power consumption (power levels explained in 3.1 Mobile Power Consumption). 
The behaviour is totally different if we focus in a larger timeout, for example 
when it is 20 seconds (Fig. 5.4). In this case the power consumption is in 
another power level, it is consuming about 0.5 W. Furthermore, it can be seen 
that each 20 seconds, when a packet is received, the power consumption 
increase momentarily. 
Finally, in Fig. 5.5 there is the power consumption when the timeout is still 
larger: 40 seconds. In this case the power changes between three different 
power levels initiated each time a packet is received. When a packet arrives it 
changes to the high level, above 1 W, after a timeout of few seconds it changes 
to a second level with a power consumption of 0.5 W and finally after a larger 
timeout without packets it changes to the lower level with a consumption of 
about few milliwatts. 
Thus, with these three different behaviours of power consumption it can be 
understood why when timeout is equal to 40 seconds it does not suit in the 
curve trend. It is because of power levels and its timeouts. With this timeout 
between packets it is forced to change to the lower power level and after to the 
high level, it makes to consume more power that maintaining in the medium 
 
Fig. 5.3 Timeout 0.1 sec 
 
Fig. 5.4 Timeout 20 sec 
 
Fig. 5.5 Timeout 40 sec 
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power level. This timeout seems to be around the critical point, because when 
the time is lower it is maintained in a low power consumption state, and when 
the timeout is larger, because it stays longer in the lowest level, it compensates 
the power consumed in the highest level. 
With all these information, we can consider that an attacker would try to send 
packets with high data rate to drain the battery as fast as possible, but it is a 
pure force attack that produces a high amount of data that may be detected by 
intrusion detection algorithms. If we change the strategy to the other extreme 
and send packets with a big timeout between them it could be that the effects of 
it are noticeable after too many hours. The better technique could be a trade-off 
between data rate of packets sent and battery drain, and in this case it is when 
the timeout between packets is around 40 seconds, because we can obtain 
almost the same battery drain that the one that we obtain when the timeout is 
equal to 2 seconds. If Nokia 5800 is been attacked receiving data with a timeout 
between packets of 40 seconds, the battery is drained 26 times faster than in 
Standby. 
5.2.1. Changing Packet Size 
This measurement is made with the aim to characterize the influence of the 
packet size of data sent. In Fig. 5.6 there is shown the behaviour of phone’s 
battery estimated operation time according to packets received at different 
timeout between packets and with different packet sizes. The scenario is the 
same that in the previous measure, the mobile has active the uplink and 
downlink channel, so it also answers to the received packets. In this measure 
the mobile is on its own, not connected to a computer. 
The test includes measures with three different packet sizes: 98, 542 and 1024 
bytes. When packet size is 98 bytes the measurement is the same that in 
previous section.  
In Fig. 5.6 we can see that when data is sent at high data rate the estimated 
battery operation time is equal for the three packet sizes. After, when the time 
between packets increase, this fact changes. Packets with size of 542 and 1042 
bytes maintain the same shape in all points, while packets of 98 bytes obtain 
higher battery operation time. The behaviour of curve with 542 and 1042 Bytes 
per packet is a lineal increment. Finally, when timeout between packets is equal 
to 40 seconds, again with the three different packet sizes they obtain the same 
battery drain. 





Fig. 5.6 Packet size change Nokia 5800 
There can be obtained some deduction from this measurement. First of all, that 
if packet size is small (98 Bytes), the estimated operation time of the mobile 
phone is larger, so the power consumption is smaller with small packet sizes 
than with large packet sizes. 
On the other hand, when the packet size is big, there is no need to send still 
bigger packets because the result is the same. It can be observed comparing 
the curve of packet size 542 and 1042 Bytes that they have the same values. 
Finally, when packets are sent at large timeout between them (40 seconds) in 
all three cases the estimated operation time is the same. This could be because 
the power is used in the building and releasing of the channel and not in data 
transfer. In this way, we can presume that timeout between packets is an 
important variable, and cannot be simply translated to data rate. 
Knowing these measurements, an attacker will still realize the attack when 
timeout between packets is equal to 40 seconds and with the smaller packet 
size, because the battery drain is the same, but the data rate is lower. 
5.3. Nokia 6120 Measurements 
The following measures are done with the mobile Nokia 6120. In Fig. 5.7 there 
is shown the behaviour of phone’s battery estimated operation time according to 
data received at different timeout between packets. The mobile has active the 
uplink and downlink channel, so it also answers to the received packets. In this 
measure the mobile phone is connected to a computer through a USB 
connection, acting like a modem. 
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In Y axis there is the estimated operation time of the battery in minutes. To 
completely understand the values of the following graphics, it has to be taken 
into account that the Standby operation time of Nokia 6120 is 140 hours (8400 
minutes). This value has been obtained in empirical measurement. 
In X axis there is the timeout between packets, the seconds that are between 
one packet ant the next one.  
 
Fig. 5.7 Estimated operation time Nokia 6120 
It can be observed that the lowest operation time is obtained when there is the 
lowest timeout between packets. When timeout between packets is 0.1 second, 
battery operation time is 240 minutes. Otherwise, the highest battery operation 
time is reached when the packets are the most separated between them, when 
the timeout between packets is 60 seconds, the estimated operation time of the 
battery is 380 minutes.  
The values of the curve are quite similar, with a slightly increase of battery 
operation time as timeout between packets is larger. To give some numerical 
values, when the timeout between packets is 3 seconds, the estimated battery 
operation time is 320 minutes, when the timeout is 15 seconds, the estimated 
battery time is 330 minutes and when the timeout is 30 seconds, the estimated 
battery time is 370 minutes. The difference in battery drain when timeout 
between packets is larger than 2 seconds is scarce, in the extreme case the 
difference is just 60 minutes. 
It is remarkable that similar to measures with Nokia 5800, when timeout 
between packets is 40 seconds, the battery operation time is lower (310 
minutes) than with a smaller timeout. In this point the battery is drained 27 times 
faster than in Standby mode. A timeout of 40 seconds can be an optimal value 
in this scenario if an attacker wants to drain battery with low data rate. Although, 
in this scenario we have to take into account that the advantage of using this 




point is no as important as in Nokia 5800 because of the small difference in the 
values of the other timeouts. 
5.3.1. Downlink Vs. Up and Downlink Channel 
The aim of the following measure is to check if it affects power consumption 
when there is used the up and downlink channel or just the downlink channel. 
This is useful because the uplink channel can be filtered in the mobile phone, 
for example through a firewall. 
As can be observed in Fig. 5.8 there is the estimated operation time of Nokia 
6120 with the mobile just receiving data (download) and the values of the 
mobile sending and receiving data (upload and download). The scenario is the 
same that in the previous measure, the mobile phone is connected to a 
computer through a USB connection, acting like a modem, and in the computer 
there is a firewall that when needed filters the uplink channel. 
The curve of uplink and downlink channel is the same that in the previous 
measure.  
From this graphic it can be observed that with the smallest timeout (0.1 second) 
between packets the values of battery drain are different. When the uplink 
channel in the mobile phone is filtered the battery lasts 300 minutes, that is 60 
minutes more than when the mobile is sending and receiving packets. 
In the remaining points of the curve, there is no appreciable difference between 
the two cases. 
 
Fig. 5.8 Downlink vs. Up and downlink channel Nokia 6120 
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According to this measurement we can say that there is difference between 
using the downlink channel or using both just when the timeout is equal to 0.1 
seconds. Otherwise, there is no difference between them. If we focus on battery 
drain attack countermeasures, we can deduce that filtering the uplink channel in 
the mobile is only useful if we are suffering a pure force attack with low timeout.  
5.3.2. Not Connected Vs. Connected to PC 
When a mobile phone is connected to Internet it can be on its own, or attached 
to a computer making the function of a modem. One can question which case is 
better to optimize power consumption. If the mobile is connected to the 
computer it consumes energy because of the physical connection with it, that 
can be a USB cable or a Bluetooth connection, but the computer is in charge of 
the processing of data packets, so the mobile phone saves energy because it 
does not need to realize this action. 
This measurement is made with the aim to characterize the influence of 
computer connection. In Fig. 5.9 there is shown the behaviour of Nokia 6120 
battery estimated operation time according to packets received at different 
timeout between packets when it is connected to the computer, and when not. 
When the mobile is connected to the computer it is made through a USB cable. 
The mobile has active the uplink and downlink channel. 
The curve of connected to computer is the same that in section 5.3. When the 
mobile is not connected to the computer it follows the same shape, but 
consuming more power. It can be seen that in this case the mobile phone 
shortens its battery lifetime. The impact of the physical connection with the 
computer produces a drop in the battery of 12 %.  
 
Fig. 5.9 Connected/not to computer Nokia 6120 




5.4. Comparing Nokia 5800 with Nokia 6120 
Finally, there is a comparison of the power behaviour of both mobile phones. 
The aim of this comparison is to check if there is a uniform behaviour in all the 
mobiles and that if the effect of the attack is needed to evaluate in each mobile. 
As the battery capacity of both phones is different, in this comparison there are 
used normalized values in the operation time range (Y axis). 
In Fig. 5.10 can be observed that Nokia 5800 and Nokia 6120 have almost the 
same behaviour in the major part of the studied area, from the timeout between 
packets almost zero until timeout equal 40 seconds. On the other hand, from 
timeout 40 seconds to 60 seconds there is a different performance, Nokia 6120 
battery is dropped significantly faster than Nokia 5800.  
 
Fig. 5.10 Comparison Nokia 5800 with Nokia 6120 
From this comparison we can tell that Nokia 5800 is optimized in the battery 
conservation in large timeout between packets. It highly increases the online 
time of the mobile compared with Nokia 6120. 
This graphic shape and optimization can be understood better if we see the 
next graphs (from Fig. 5.11 to Fig. 5.24) where it shows Nokia 5800 power 
consumption (Y axis) over time (X axis) in different timeout between packets 
whereas the last graphs (Fig. 5.25 and Fig. 5.26) show Nokia 6120 power 
consumption.  
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Fig. 5.11 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 0.1 sec 
 
Fig. 5.12 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 0.3 sec 
 
 
Fig. 5.13 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 0.5 sec 
 
Fig. 5.14 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 1 sec 
 
 
Fig. 5.15 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 2 sec 
 
Fig. 5.16 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 3 sec 
 
 
Fig. 5.17 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 5 sec 
 
Fig. 5.18 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 10 sec 
 





Fig. 5.19 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 20 sec 
 
Fig. 5.20 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 25 sec 
 
 
Fig. 5.21 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 30 sec 
 
Fig. 5.22 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 40 sec 
 
 
Fig. 5.23 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 45 sec 
 
 
Fig. 5.24 Nokia 5800 – Tout: 60 sec 
 
 
Fig. 5.25 Nokia 6120 – Tout: 45 sec 
 
Fig. 5.26 Nokia 6120 – Tout: 60 sec 
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In timeout 0.1 seconds (Fig. 5.11) we can see that the mobile phone is in a high 
power state. It is constantly consuming more than 1 W. It is the case in which 
the mobile phone battery is drained faster. 
From timeout 0.3 to 25 seconds (Fig. 5.11 to Fig. 5.20) the mobile phone power 
behaviour is different. It is in another power level consuming about 0.5 W 
constantly, with the exception that each time a packet is received it increases 
the power consumed just for an instant. If we observe the battery operation time 
in Fig. 5.10 from 0.3 to 25 seconds it is nearly a constant line that increases 
when timeout between packets is larger. This battery time increase is produce 
because as the packets are more spaced, the instant power increases 
associated with each packet are more infrequent. 
Finally, from 30 to 60 seconds (Fig. 5.21 to Fig. 5.26) the mobile phone has 
different power performance. As packets are highly spaced out, power 
management follows another pattern. When a packet is received it changes to a 
high power state and consumes about 1.2 W, and is maintained in this state for 
few seconds. After, it changes to a lower power state where it consumes 0.5 W. 
It is maintained in this state several seconds, and after it decreases to a still 
lower power level where just consumes few mW. When a packet is received 
again, it changes to the high power level and repeats this behaviour. 
When timeout are 45 and 60 seconds, the performance of Nokia 5800 is 
different from Nokia 6120. Nokia 6120 follows the behaviour described 
previously, while Nokia 5800 just uses the highest power level and the lowest 
one. In this way, it is optimized and saves energy compared with the other 
mobile when data packets are spaced out. 




CHAPTER 6. MODELLING AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
These chapter deals with two different topics, the first one is modelling the 
energy consumption of a mobile phone. Now we are using Energy Profiler to 
evaluate the power consumption in the mobile phone, but we want to know it 
without any application.  
The second topic is to define a method to find out the amount data that can be 
sent with certain energy. With it, it will be possible to detect when an application 
is consuming power in an inefficient way.  
6.1. Modelling Energy Consumption 
For modelling the energy consumption of a mobile phone we need some input 
information. This essential data is the incoming traffic with its timestamp.  
Empirically, it has been demonstrated that the power consumed in a mobile 
phone can be divided in different steps or levels. When the mobile receives a 
packet it is in the highest power level, and when there is no packet received 
during some timeout, it changes to another inferior level and so on until the 
lowest power level. For modelling power consumption of a mobile phone we 
need to match the power levels with the amount of power consumed and the 
adequate timeouts between them. 
There is a problem, that it is possible that different mobile phones have different 
power behaviour, so we are going to test the model with a specific mobile 
phone.  
6.1.1. Modelling Nokia 5800  
Part of the data obtained in measurements of Chapter 5 it is the exact arriving 
time of the packets in the mobile phone, recorded with Wireshark. So it is 
possible to measure the energy consumption of the mobile phone and therefore 
its battery duration time. 
The following graphics and values are obtained in mobile phone Nokia 5800 
with uplink and downlink channels active and not connected to a computer. In 
Fig. 6.1 there are the power level steps used to model the power impact of 
receiving a single packet.  
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The timeout from one level to the lower one is taken experimentally, like the 
values of the power in each level. 
There are 4 power levels, the empirical values of each level is in Table 6.1. 
These four power levels can be caused because of different access speeds in 
each level (Table 3.1 Power levels and access speed).  
 
Fig. 6.1 Modelled power levels 
 
Level Power 
Level 1 1.41 W 
Level 2 0.75 W 
Level 3 0.39 W 
Level 4 0.1 W 
Table 6.1 Empirically power levels 
The transition from one power level to another depends of different factors. It is 
based in which level it was, how many seconds have elapsed since last packet 
received and if at the moment it is receiving a packet or not. 
When the mobile is receiving packets it has to be in level 1 or 2, it depends on 
the timeout between packets. 
Our model starts in level 4, the lowest, and is maintained in this state while 
there is no packet received.  




When the mobile receives a packet it changes to level 1, the highest. It is 
maintained in level 1 while it receives packets with a timeout lower than 6 sec. If 
the mobile is more than 6 sec without receiving any packet it changes to level 2.  
The mobile can be maintained in level 2 because of two facts, because it is 
receiving packets at low data rate or because it has been a timeout of 28 
seconds without receiving any packet. If it is receiving packets at high data rate 
it changes to level 1. 
After the timeout of level 2 without receiving packets it changes to level 3. When 
it is in level 3, if a packet is received it automatically changes to level 1. If it is in 
level 3 and there are no incoming packets during 28 seconds it changes to level 
4. 
While it is in level 4 and there are no incoming packets the mobile is maintained 
in this level until it arrives a packet and changes to level 1. 
In Fig. 6.2 there are all the possible transitions from one state to the others. 
 
Fig. 6.2 Power level transitions 
The granularity of the time is 0.25 seconds, because it is the same granularity 
that Nokia Energy Profiler has, and the data used is obtained with Energy 
Profiler. 
The modelling program for power consumption is made applying the power 
level and transitions described previously. It is a Matlab file, which is included 
following.  
This program needs as input data a vector with the timestamp of received 
packets in the mobile phone and we obtain as an output the values of power 
consumed in the mobile phone and a plot of this power per time.  
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%timeoutaux = timeoutX (skype/webbrowsing/file download) 
clear theoreticalpower; 
powerprofile_artifical(1) = 1.41; %level 1 
powerprofile_artifical(2) = 0.75 ;%level 2 
powerprofile_artifical(3) = 0.39; %level 3 
powerprofile_artifical(4) = 0.1; %level 4 
 nextevent = 0 + timeoutaux(1); 
lastevent = 0; 
k = 1; 
level = 4; 
lastlevel=4; 
lastleveltime=0; 
for j = 0.25 : 0.25 : sum(timeoutaux) 
    now_time = j; 
    if (now_time > nextevent) 
        lastevent = nextevent; 
        %Because sometimes we receive more than one packet at the same time 
        while (nextevent < now_time + 0.25) && (k < length(timeoutaux)) 
            nextevent = nextevent + timeoutaux(k); 
            k=k+1; 
        end 
        %if we receive a packet 
        if (lastlevel == 1) && (timeoutaux(k) <=5.75) && (lastleveltime<= 6) 
            level = 1; 
        elseif (lastlevel == 1) && (timeoutaux(k) > 5.75)||(lastleveltime > 6) 
            level = 2; 
        elseif (lastlevel == 2) && (timeoutaux(k) <= 0.1) 
            level = 1; 
        elseif (lastlevel == 2) && (timeoutaux(k) > 0.1) 
            level = 2; 
        else 
            level = 1; 
        end 
        lastleveltime = 0.25; 
        deltatime = 0; 
    else 
        %if we don't receive any packet 
        if (lastlevel == 1) && (lastleveltime<= 6) 
            level = 1; 
        elseif (lastlevel == 1) && (lastleveltime > 6) 
            level = 2; 
            lastleveltime = 0; 
        elseif (lastlevel == 2) && (lastleveltime<= 28) 
            level = 2; 
        elseif (lastlevel == 2) && (lastleveltime > 28) 
            level = 3; 
            lastleveltime = 0; 
        elseif (lastlevel ==3) && (lastleveltime <= 28) 
            level = 3; 
        else 
            level = 4; 
            lastleveltime = 0; 
        end 
    end 
    lastleveltime = lastleveltime + 0.25; 
     
    lastlevel = level; 
    theoreticalpower(j*4) = powerprofile_artifical(level);      
end 
plot ((1:sum(timeoutaux)*4)/4/60, theoreticalpower) 




6.1.2. Result of Modelling Nokia 5800  
To prove the adjustment of the model of power consumption with the real 
measurement, it is check in some particular cases. The tests consists in having 
a mobile phone connected to a computer, the mobile is running Nokia Energy 
Profiler to monitor the real power consumption. The computer is running 
Wireshark capturing packets in the network interface of the mobile phone, so 
thanks to it we will have the exactly timing of the packets (Fig. 6.3). 
The test consists in the mobile phone downloading traffic from Internet for some 
time to recollect the values needed to model the power. After, it is possible to 
model the energy consumption with the modelling program. As Energy Profiler 
has also been running in the mobile phone, we have the actual consumption. 
To download data we have tested with three typical applications, having Skype 









Fig. 6.3 Measurements and data collection to model power 
 
We evaluated the empirical and the modelled results and they are resemblance. 
Next, there is a screenshot of power consumption when surfing the network 
test. In Fig. 6.4 there is shown the result of power consumed by time empirically 
showed by Energy Profiler and in Fig. 6.5 the power simulated with the model. 
At a glance it can be seen that the modelled power consumption is similar with 
the empirical one, and analysing it we obtain that they are similar a 93%.  
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     Fig. 6.4 Empirical power 
 
            Fig. 6.5 Modelled power 
6.2. Energy Efficiency 
We are evaluating the power consumption of mobile phones and related to this 
a possible attack that produces the phone to consume more power than in 
normal operation. The mobile phone’s battery drain attack is characterized for 
using low-rate, low-volume traffic. Thus, this attack can effectively evade 
detection by today’s intrusion detection systems.  
From the measurements obtained in Chapter 5 we can observe that there is no 
region free of this attack, so there is not possible to filter received packet 
according to the timeout between packets. 
After focusing on the characteristics of this attack, we define a new parameter 
called “Energy Efficiency” to detect if a mobile is been attack. This attack sends 
low-volume traffic to the target, but produces it to consume more power that 
what it should in normal conditions. Energy efficiency value will detect this 
situations, when there is used a high quantity of power for receiving a small 
quantity of data. 
6.2.1. Definition 
Energy Efficiency is defined as the amount of data that can be sent for a 
quantity of energy. In formula 6.1 there is a deduction of the formula. 




                    
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6.2.2. Different Services Example 
The use of Energy Efficiency can be seen in the following example. We are 
going to consider three different activities related with receiving data from 
Internet. These are Skype, web browsing and downloading a file. All the 
following test are realized with Nokia 5800. 
The traffic patterns of these three activities are different. In the case of being 
connected in Skype, without realizing any call, the mobile phone is receiving 
traffic with random timeout between packets to update the state of contacts. 
In the case of web browsing it is totally different, the user looks for a web page 
and totally downloads it, and after is reading the information so it is some time 
without receiving data. After some time it downloads another web page and 
after reads it and so on. 
Finally, in the file download case it is absolutely different, the mobile is always 
receiving packets until the file is totally download. 
In Fig. 6.6 there is the representation of the traffic patterns, each black lines is a 
received packet and in grey colour it is the expected energy consumption for 
each activity. 
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Fig. 6.6 Traffic patterns 
To calculate if these activities are energy efficient we recorded the average data 
rate of data received and the average power consumed. Then, applying formula 
6.1 we can calculate the Energy Efficiency of each activity.  
In Table 6.2 there can be seen the values of each activity, including the Energy 







Skype 1.3 kbytes/sec 0.95 W 1.4 kbytes/Joule 
Web browsing 9 kbytes/sec 1 W 9 kbytes/Joule 
File download 119 kbytes/sec 1.49 W 80 kbytes/Joule 
Table 6.2 Energy efficiency different cases 
To evaluate the result of the Energy Efficiency parameter we have to take into 
account that a low value means that the mobile phone can receive low data with 
some amount of energy, while a large value means that it is possible to receive 
a large quantity of data with the same amount of power. Summarizing, the best 
case is when Energy Efficient value is high, because it can receive large 
amount of data with low power consumption. 




Observing the results of Table 6.2 it can be conclude that the most energy 
efficient activity is downloading a file, it can be download 80 kbytes consuming 
one Joule. On the contrary, the less efficient is Skype, because with one Joule it 
can just download 1.4 kbytes.  
Finally, in the middle term there is web browsing, that the average power 
consumed is more or less the same that Skype, but it sends 7 times more data. 
6.2.3. Data Received per Battery Cycle 
To make the values obtained in the three different activities more clear, it can 
be calculated the amount data that a mobile phone can receive with one battery 
cycle which each service. 
The measures have been done with mobile Nokia 5800, so it is used its battery 
capacity to calculate the data able to receive with each service. 
Battery capacity: 1320 mAh 
                          ⁄           
Voltage: 3.7 V 
                                 
We can obtain the Mbytes downloaded by a program each battery cycle if we 
have the Energy Efficiency: 
               
             ⁄                             
With the services of the previous tests we obtain that during one battery cycle 
the mobile phone is able to receive: 
                        ⁄              
                             ⁄             
                               ⁄              
Summarizing, with one battery cycle it is possible to download 25 Mbytes using 
Skype, 160 Mbytes browsing a web and 1.4 Gbytes if we are downloading a file. 
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We have to bear in mind that the amount of downloaded data is not proportional 
with the total time that the mobile phone will be operative. With the activity of 
downloading a file the battery of the phone is going to be drained faster than in 
the other cases because the mobile phone will always be in a high power level. 
On the other hand, when the phone is having Skype on it will last longer time 
turned-on because it is in a lower energy level. 
This analysis is useful not just to detect a malicious attack, also to improve the 
work of professionals related to mobile phones world. For example to mobile 
phone software developers that want to preserve phone’s battery, they have to 
find a trade-off between the data that the application needs to download and the 
battery duration time, trying to maximize this last. 




CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this project we detect and demonstrate an attack able to drain mobile phone’s 
battery in short time. This research was motivated by previous work [11] and [1]. 
They both analyse some threats to mobile phones and networks related to 
undesired traffic. Our study is based in unwanted downlink traffic that makes the 
mobile phone to shorten its battery lifetime, so it is focused in end user 
consequences, having other works centred in the consequences to overload the 
control plane of a 3G network [1]. In the course of the study we centred in 
analysing the attack consequence and we omitted how to obtain the possible 
targets for this attack since it is discussed in [11].  
We wanted to create an attack to 3G mobile phones and needed to know in 
which events the terminal consumes more power and apply it to get a powerful 
attack that drains the battery. For realizing it we studied the network 
configuration and control plane of UMTS to after define the characteristics of the 
battery drain attack. The main point of this analysis lead us to research in the 
power behaviour of mobile phones in different situations, discovering that there 
exist four power levels that depend on connection establishment and traffic 
send and received in the mobile phone.  
We began having a theoretical attack defined and in order to try if it worked we 
did measurements with several terminals to demonstrate that the battery drain 
attack is a real threat, and that it is mobile independent. We obtained, after 
execute and analyse tests, that an attacker sending low data traffic can drain 
the mobile phone’s battery 26 times faster than in stand-by mode. 
Next step that we had was to find countermeasures to this attack. The low data 
volume of this attack makes it not detectable by current security mechanisms, 
thus we work on mitigating solutions and defined a variable to detect if data is 
being transmitted in an efficient way. “Energy Efficiency” expresses the amount 
of bytes that can be transmitted with 1 Joule. This variable can also be used for 
better mobile service designs in terms of energy usage. 
The problem is that to obtain this value we need to monitor some parameters, 
like the average data rate and the average power. Thinking in the easy 
obtaining of the values, we modelled the energy consumption of a mobile 
phone, so it will not be necessary to record plenty of data, having just the 
packet timeouts it can be known the power behaviour. 
Finally, remark that in security topic there is still plenty of future work to deal 
with, specifically in security on cellular technologies focusing on end user 
devices.  
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Appendix A. Acronyms 
 
3G 3rd Generation 
3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
BCCH  Broadcast Control Channel 
BCH Broadcast Channel 
BS Base Station 
BS Base Station 
CCCH Common Control Channel 
CN Core Network 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
CSD Circuit Switched Data 
CSV Comma-Separated Values 
CTCH Common Traffic Channel 
DCCH Dedicated Control Channel 
DCH Dedicated Channel 
DoS Denial-of-Service 
DRX Discontinuous Reception 
DSCH Downlink Shared Channel 
DTCH Dedicated Traffic Channel 
EDGE 
Enhanced Data Rates for GSM 
Evolution 
EGPRS 
Enhanced Data Rates for GSM 
Evolution 
EGSM Extended GSM 
FACH Forward Access Channel 
GGSN Gateway GPRS Support Node 
GMSC Gateway Mobile Switching Centre 
GPRS General Packet Radio Service 
GSM 
Global System for Mobile 
communications 
HSCSD High-Speed Circuit-Switched Data 
HSDPA High-Speed Downlink Packet Access 
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol 
IEEE 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
IP Internet Protocol 
MAC Media Access Control 
ME Mobile Equipment 
MSC Mobile Switching Center 
NAND Not AND 
OS Operating System 
OSI Open System Interconnection 





PCCH Paging Control Channel 
PCH Paging Channel 
PDP Packet Data Protocol 
PHY Physical Layer 
PICH Paging Indicator Channel 
PPP Point-to-Point 
PS Packet Switched 
RACH Random Access Channel 
RAM Random-Access Memory 
RFC Request for Comments 
RNC Radio Network Controller 
RRC Radio Resource Control 
SDRAM 
Synchronous Dynamic Random 
Access Memory 
SGSN Serving GPRS Support Node 
SIM Subscriber Identity Module 
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
UE User Equipment 
UMTS 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System 
URA UTRAN Registration Area 
USB Universal Serial Bus 
USIM UMTS SIM 
USIM UMTS Subscriber Identity Module 
UTRA UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access 
UTRAN 
UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access 
Network 
WAP Wireless Application Protocol 
WCDMA 
Wideband Code Division Multiple 
Access 
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network 
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Appendix B. Port Scan Results 
 
Port scan to all the TCP ports of a UMTS mobile phone. 
65535 ports analyzed: 
 1 open port 
 80 filtered ports (which don’t drain battery) 
 65454 closed ports (which drain battery) 
 
 
PORT     STATE    SERVICE      REASON 
 
912/tcp  open     unknown      syn-ack 
 
111/tcp  filtered rpcbind      no-response 
135/tcp  filtered msrpc        no-response 
136/tcp  filtered profile      no-response 
137/tcp  filtered netbios-ns   no-response 
138/tcp  filtered netbios-dgm  no-response 
139/tcp  filtered netbios-ssn  no-response 
177/tcp  filtered xdmcp        no-response  
445/tcp  filtered microsoft-ds no-response  
1433/tcp filtered ms-sql-s     no-response  
2049/tcp filtered nfs          no-response  
2745/tcp filtered unknown      no-response  
2967/tcp filtered unknown      no-response  
3127/tcp filtered unknown      no-response  
4045/tcp filtered lockd        no-response  
4899/tcp filtered radmin       no-response  
6000/tcp filtered X11        no-response 
6001/tcp filtered X11:1      no-response 
6002/tcp filtered X11:2      no-response 
6003/tcp filtered X11:3      no-response 
6004/tcp filtered X11:4      no-response 
6005/tcp filtered X11:5      no-response 
6006/tcp filtered X11:6      no-response 
6007/tcp filtered X11:7      no-response 
6008/tcp filtered X11:8      no-response 
6009/tcp filtered X11:9      no-response 
6010/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6011/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6012/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6013/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6014/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6015/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6016/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6017/tcp filtered xmail-ctrl no-response 
6018/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6019/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6020/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6021/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6022/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6023/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6024/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6025/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 




6026/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6027/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6028/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6029/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6030/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6031/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6032/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6033/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6034/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6035/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6036/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6037/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6038/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6039/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6040/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6041/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6042/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6043/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6044/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6045/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6046/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6047/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6048/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6049/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6050/tcp filtered arcserve   no-response 
6051/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6052/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6053/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6054/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6055/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6056/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6057/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6058/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6059/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6060/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6061/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6062/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6063/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
6129/tcp filtered unknown    no-response 
 
